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Abstract
The constraints of lightweight distributed computing environments
such as wireless sensor networks lend themselves to the use of sym-
metric cryptography to provide security services. The lack of central
infrastructure after deployment of such networks requires the neces-
sary symmetric keys to be predistributed to participating nodes. The
rich mathematical structure of combinatorial designs has resulted in
the proposal of several key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor
networks based on designs. We review and examine the appropriate-
ness of combinatorial designs as a tool for building key predistribution
schemes suitable for such environments.
1 Introduction
The management of cryptographic keys in any information system is one of
the most challenging aspects of implementing cryptography. One of the most
important key management processes is key establishment, which governs the
placement of cryptographic keys in a network. This is especially relevant
in applications of symmetric cryptography, where it is necessary to ensure
that all parties who are authorised to access (or verify) a cryptographically
protected piece of information have the appropriate key.
Symmetric key establishment almost always involves a trusted third
party, which we will term a key management authority (KMA), at some
stage in the process. In some environments this KMA is online and avail-
able at time of use. In such cases the third party is often referred to as
a key distribution centre. However in many other environments it is not
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possible for a KMA to form part of a live network and assist in online key
establishment. In this case the KMA can only be involved in initialisation
processes that take place prior to deployment of the network. At this stage
the KMA must equip each node in the network with the necessary crypto-
graphic keys for facilitating security services after the nodes are deployed in
the network. Key establishment schemes of this type are usually referred to
as key predistribution schemes (KPSs) because the keys are distributed in
advance and cannot be generated “on the fly”.
A major current trend in computing technologies is a shift from cen-
tralised, relatively stable, wired networks consisting of powerful devices, to
distributed, dynamic (ad hoc), wireless networks consisting of lightweight
devices. This is being driven by the development of very small wireless
computers, which can either be deployed on their own or embedded into
everyday objects. The resulting ubiquitous networks have several impor-
tant characteristics that typically include the need to conduct basic network
services such as routing using the network nodes themselves (rather than
via a centralised infrastructure), high unavailability rates of nodes, and the
need for highly efficient network protocols due to the power and energy con-
straints of the nodes. From the perspective of providing security services,
these characteristics lend themselves to the use of symmetric cryptography
and to key predistribution for key establishment.
Wireless sensor networks are just one class of emerging technologies of
this type. While we will frame our discussion around wireless sensor net-
works, which is the context for almost all of the related research, it is worth
noting that many of the schemes we discuss may be equally applicable to
other technologies with similar characteristics to wireless sensor networks.
Combinatorial structures are natural objects on which to model many
aspects of symmetric key management. For a survey of their contributions
to key establishment, see [19]. In this paper we will focus only on key pre-
distribution, and on the application of combinatorial designs in particular.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we discuss wireless sensor
networks, outlining aspects which are of relevance to key predistribution. In
Sect. 3 we provide a brief background to combinatorial designs. In Sect. 4
we outline a basic model for a KPS and discuss fundamental schemes. In
the remaining sections we look at different applications of designs to key
predistribution. In Sect. 5 we discuss direct application of designs as KPSs.
In Sect. 6 we look at the use of designs as building blocks for KPSs. Finally in
Sect. 7 we focus on KPSs for special networking environments. Throughout
the discussion we will consider the extent to which combinatorial designs
are genuinely useful for building KPSs for wireless sensor networks.
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2 Wireless Sensor Networks
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is an ad hoc network formed from a collec-
tion of low-powered sensor nodes that gather data and use wireless commu-
nication to transmit the information that they collect. The number of nodes
can vary between dozens to thousands, depending on the application [26].
WSNs are best suited to applications where some form of environmental
monitoring is required, but where the scale and hostility of the environment
does not lend itself to the deployment of a few expensive monitoring devices
(such as humans). Examples include seismic data gathering, remote habi-
tat monitoring, gathering of ecological data, forestry welfare, agriculture,
disaster relief operations and military intelligence gathering [22, 1, 2]. The
typical characteristics of a WSN are:
• Highly constrained nodes. The nodes are very small battery-powered
devices and are highly constrained with respect to memory storage
and power. They are thus limited in their computational and commu-
nication ability.
• Lack of central control. Once deployed, most WSNs do not feature any
central control node. Thus all network functionality must be achieved
through co-operation between the nodes.
• Requirement to form a network to a sink. In most WSNs the assump-
tion is that the sensor nodes will take readings and then attempt to
communicate this data back to a sink, which is a more powerful de-
vice that will periodically connect to the WSN and request data. The
location of this sink in the network is typically not fixed (it could, for
example, be a portable laptop).
• Hop-based communication. Most WSNs use radio communication to
connect between nodes. The constrained nature of the nodes means
that in most cases the communication range of a node will be much
smaller than the network diameter. Thus nodes communicate by hop-
ping, meaning that a node passes data to a node within range, who
then passes it onto a node within its range, etc.
• Dynamic network structure. It is generally assumed that WSNs are
highly dynamic. Nodes are often assumed to regularly “sleep” to con-
serve battery power. Nodes expire once their battery is drained. In
some WSNs the nodes are mobile, although in most current applica-
tions they are static.
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• Nodes vulnerable to compromise. The constrained nature of sensor
nodes mean that strong security protection such as tamper-resistance
is usually not viable. Thus it is normally assumed that sensor nodes
can be fairly easily captured and that any sensitive information (such
as keys) that is stored on them is likely to be exposed.
We will make three restrictions on the type of WSN that we consider for
most of this paper:
1. Homogeneous nodes. We will assume that all nodes have the same
capabilities and constraints.
2. Communication structure. We will assume that the main aim of any
communication in the WSN is to send data from a node to the sink.
We will thus not be attempting to set up fully connected subnetworks
or establish group keys.
3. No mobility. We will assume (for simplicity) that nodes are not mobile
after deployment. In fact many of the solutions discussed here are also
appropriate for mobile nodes.
An important issue that affects KPS design is that WSNs vary in the extent
to which the location of nodes is known prior to deployment. We will thus
follow [20] by classifying WSNs as being either:
1. Uncontrolled if the location of sensors cannot be predicted before de-
ployment. This is the default WSN scenario and assumes that the
application environment is sufficiently hostile that nodes cannot be
positioned in any controlled way. For example, they may be released
from the air over a disaster site.
2. Partially controlled if some information about the location of sensors
is known before deployment. This might be the case when sensors are
strategically released from the air in batches.
3. Fully controlled if the precise location of sensors is known before de-
ployment. This is likely to be the case, for example, when sensors are
deployed in a grid in a vineyard to monitor ground humidity.
We will generally assume that a WSN is uncontrolled, however we will dis-
cuss KPSs for other types of WSN in Sect. 7.
There has been some debate about the practicality of using public key
cryptography to implement security services in a WSN [18]. While this
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may indeed become more practical (and where it is, some aspects of key es-
tablishment may become easier), the case for designing solutions that only
use symmetric cryptography remains strong. Symmetric cryptography is
still preferred in many modern applications which are not as resource con-
strained as WSNs because of the efficiency gains and the unique problems
posed by management of public keys. Perhaps more compellingly, it is likely
that as soon as public key cryptography is practical on a given sensor node
technology, even more constrained sensor technology will be being developed
where it is not. In this paper we assume that a fully symmetric solution is
required.
3 Combinatorial Designs
In this section we briefly review some definitions and notation that we will
employ later. We refer the reader to the combinatorial literature for further
details [12].
A set system (I,B) consists of a set I of v elements (points) and a
collection B of subsets (blocks) of I. The degree of x ∈ I is the number of
blocks of B containing x and (I,B) is regular if all points have the same
degree r. The rank k of (I,B) is the size of the largest block in B and we
say that (I,B) is uniform if all blocks have size k.
A regular, uniform set system with |I| = v, |B| = b is known as a
(v, b, r, k)-design. In such designs it must be the case that bk = vr. A
(v, b, r, k)-design in which every t points occurs on precisely λ blocks is known
as a t-(v, b, r, k, λ)-design (we often just refer to a t-(v, k, λ)-design since b
and r can then be uniquely derived). In a dual design, the roles of points
and blocks are interchanged. Symmetric designs are self-dual and thus have
v = b, k = r and every t blocks meeting in λ points. A symmetric 2-
(s2 + s+ 1, s2 + s+ 1, s + 1, s + 1, 1)-design is known as a projective plane.
A set system is a group-divisible design GD(nu, k) if v = nu and there
exists a partition H of I into u groups of size n such that:
1. Every H ∈ H intersects a block B ∈ B in at most one point;
2. Every pair of points from different groups occur together in precisely
one block.
A transversal design TD(k, n) is a GD(nk, k) (in this case every H ∈ H
intersects a block B ∈ B in precisely one point). A TD(t, k, n) is a further
generalisation where the second condition is applied to sets of t points, rather
than pairs. A TD(k, n) is resolvable if the blocks can be partitioned into sets
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B1,B2, . . . ,Bs such that each point of the design is contained in exactly one
block in each set. These sets are known as parallel classes.
A graph G = (I, E) consists of a set of of vertices I joined by edges in
E , where E ⊆ I × I. We say that a pair of vertices U and V are adjacent if
{U, V } ∈ E . The degree of a vertex U is the number of vertices adjacent to
U . A graph is regular of degree r if all vertices have degree r. A complete
t-partite graph is a graph whose vertices can be partitioned into t disjoint
subsets such that two vertices are adjacent if and only if they belong to
distinct subsets. An (n, r, λ, µ)-strongly regular graph is a regular graph on
n vertices with degree r such that any two distinct vertices have λ common
neighbours if they are adjacent and µ common neighbours if they are not
adjacent.
4 Key Predistribution Schemes for WSNs
In this section we provide an introduction to key predistribution for WSNs.
4.1 Key Predistribution Stages
The lack of any central control nodes in a WSN means that in order to
equip sensor nodes with symmetric keys, a KMA will need to load keys
onto nodes prior to deployment using a KPS to determine which keys are
allocated to which nodes. After deployment, two nodes will be able to use
a cryptographic service on a network link (such as encryption or a MAC) if
they:
1. are in radio communication range of one another; and
2. share at least one key.
If either of these conditions is not met then the nodes will have to seek a
path of network links connecting them such that these conditions are met
on each of the intermediate hops. Key establishment in a WSN can thus be
regarded as consisting of the following three stages:
1. Key predistribution. The KMA chooses a KPS defined on the n nodes
U = {U1, . . . , Un} in the network. Following [16], this KPS can de
modelled by a set system (I,B) (sometimes referred to as a key ring),
where I = {xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ v} is a set of v key identifiers and B = {Bj :
1 ≤ j ≤ n} is a set of n node allocations. For each key identifier xi,
the KMA randomly selects a key Ki. The KMA then associates each
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node Uj in the network with a node allocation Bj and issues Uj with
the keys Lj = {Ki : xi ∈ Bj}. Note that the association of Uj with
Bj need not be a secret, however the instantiation of Bj by Lj must
be.
2. Shared key discovery. If two nodes within communication range of
one another wish to deploy a cryptographic service, they first need to
determine if they have any keys in common. The default method is
to broadcast their node allocations to one another, but more efficient
techniques can sometimes be found. If they have key identifiers in
common then a session key can be generated from the common keys
associated with these identifiers by means of a suitable key derivation
function.
3. Path-key establishment. If two nodes fail to identify common keys dur-
ing shared key discovery then they need to find a secure path between
one another that employs intermediate nodes which can. Obviously,
the shorter this secure path the better.
4.2 Requirements
The main challenge in designing a KPS that is suitable for this type of
environment is that a balance must be sought between competing, and to
an extent contradictory, requirements:
• Storage. Nodes are memory constrained and thus the number of keys
stored on each node should be kept as low as possible.
• Connectivity. A WSN is dynamic and communication is expensive,
thus each node should store sufficient keys that secure paths through
the network can be established when needed. There are various dif-
ferent measures for connectivity that could be applied in the context
of WSNs. Measures of global connectivity assess the connectivity of
the entire network as a whole. If the node allocations for any two
nodes have non-empty intersection then we will refer to the network
as having full connectivity. Measures of local connectivity, which as-
sess the ability of nodes to form secure paths with nodes in their close
neighbourhood are probably most appropriate. One such, from [14],
is the probability that Ui and Uj have at least one key in common
(i.e. Bi ∩ Bj 6= ∅). This notion can be generalised to measure local
connectivity with respect to secure paths of two hops or more.
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• Resilience. Nodes are vulnerable to compromise, thus keys should
be distributed in such a way that the damage caused by exposure
of the keys stored on a node is controlled. It is not clear what the
“right” measure of resilience is in a WSN. One suggested measure
used in [15] is fail(s), which is the probability that a link between two
noncompromised nodes Ui and Uj is affected after s other nodes S are
compromised at random, where a link is affected if Bi ∩ Bj 6= ∅ and
Bi ∩ Bj ⊆ ∪Uk∈SBk. Another measure proposed in [27] evaluates the
probability that compromise of s nodes exposes all the keys from at
least one different (not compromised) node allocation.
• Efficiency. There are several processes involved in key establishment
for a WSN that it may be desirable to make as efficient as possible
since nodes are constrained by limited battery power. These include
computation, shared key discovery and path-key establishment. We
will be considering the first two, but note that path-key establishment
generally involves consideration of routing algorithms in WSNs, which
is out of scope for our discussion.
• Network size. Since many applications of WSNs involve large numbers
of nodes, it is important that a KPS can support a large number of
nodes.
The main challenge in designing KPSs is that several of these requirements
tend to compete with one another. For example, increasing the maximum
number of nodes that can be supported often involves increasing the storage
at each node. Also, many KPSs trade off measures of connectivity against
resilience.
4.3 Baseline Schemes
There are several important baseline KPSs. Although these are not all
designed for WSNs, they provide benchmark schemes that can also be used
to illustrate the requirements tradeoffs.
Single Key KPS This KPS consists of a single key that is stored by each
node in the network. It provides optimal connectivity and storage, but
has very poor resilience since all communication links are affected by
a single node capture.
8
Complete Pairwise Key KPS In this KPS, a unique key is assigned to
each pair of nodes. This scheme has optimal connectivity and opti-
mal resilience, since compromise of one node does not affect any pair
of non-compromised nodes. However this KPS requires each node to
store n−1 keys, which is infeasible if n is large (which will be the case
in many WSNs).
Blom’s KPS[5, 6] This scheme uses a symmetric bivariate polynomial
over a finite field GF(q), i.e. a polynomial P (x, y) ∈ GF(q)[x, y] with
the property that P (i, j) = P (j, i) for all i, j ∈ GF(q). Node Ui stores
the univariate polynomial fi(y) = P (Ui, y). In order to establish a
common key with Uj , node Ui computes Kij = fi(Uj) = fj(Ui). This
process enables any two nodes to share a common key. If P has degree
w, then each share consists of a degree w univariate polynomial hence
each node must store the w + 1 coefficients of this polynomial, which
requires as much space as storing w + 1 keys. Blom’s KPS thus has
optimal connectivity and reasonable storage. It also has very simple
shared key discovery, with two nodes simply needing to broadcast their
identities to one another. With respect to resilience, an adversary who
captures s nodes, where s ≤ t, does not learn any information about
keys established between non-compromised nodes. However an adver-
sary who captures w+1 or more nodes can interpolate the polynomial
P and hence learn all the keys.
Note that Blom’s KPS does not strictly conform to the model in
Sect. 4.1 since each user stores secret information that allows it to
generate its node allocation rather than storing the separate key iden-
tifiers. Thus it reduces storage at the cost of requiring computation in
the form of polynomial evaluations each time a key identifier is estab-
lished.
Random KPS [13] This scheme is a probabilistic KPS, with each node
drawing keys uniformly without replacement from some finite keypool
K. The properties of this scheme depend on the number of keys drawn
and the size of K. In the basic scheme any two nodes can communicate
securely if they share at least one key. The basic scheme was further
parameterised in [11], where an additional threshold parameter was
introduced so that two nodes are required to have at least a threshold
number of keys in common before they can derive a key.
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These baseline KPSs provide suitable motivation for several observations
concerning the building of KPSs for WSNs:
1. Optimal connectivity is not necessary. Optimal connectivity is a nice
feature, but unnecessary in a KPS for a WSN. It is certainly not needed
in fully controlled WSNs. However, even in uncontrolled WSNs, since
only a minority of sensor nodes will be within communication range of
one another, the “costs” of optimal connectivity might not be worth
paying.
2. Deterministic schemes have some advantages. The obvious advantage
of deterministic KPSs is that we can generally make definitive state-
ments about their properties, which aids analysis. The example of
Blom’s KPS also illustrates that in deterministic schemes it may be
possible to have very efficient shared key discovery. Lee and Stinson
[14] also point out that deterministic schemes tend to involve fewer
expensive pseudorandom computations during the key predistribution
stage. In [25] it was argued that in certain cases probabilistic solu-
tions tend to converge to deterministic schemes, thus studying the
latter provides valuable insight.
3. Flexibility is attractive. An attractive feature of the random KPS is
that it is highly configurable with respect to the competing require-
ments. Blom’s KPS, for example, allows only minor tradeoffs to be
made between storage and resilience.
4. Compromise is desirable. It is unlikely that a WSN application will
want the extreme tradeoffs seen in the case of the single and com-
plete pairwise KPS. Even Blom’s KPS is probably not enough of a
compromise, with low storage coming at the cost of low resilience and
computation requirements. Thus even if a KPS cannot offer flexibil-
ity, it is desirable that it offers a “reasonable” compromise between
the competing requirements of Sect. 4.2.
There have been a large number of proposals for KPSs for WSNs. These tend
to either be variants of the random KPS, deterministic KPSs, proposals for
combining schemes or KPSs with special properties. There are also several
surveys [8, 20, 31], each of which takes a slightly different approach. We will
now focus primarily on proposals that utilise combinatorial designs.
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5 Direct Application of Designs
Combinatorial designs are very natural objects to consider as candidate key
rings for KPSs. They have the advantages of being deterministic and having
rich and well understood structure. Indeed, they have been associated with
the building of KPSs long before the emergence of WSNs [23]. In this
section we consider the direct application of (v, b, r, k)-designs as key rings
for a KPS.
5.1 Two Interesting Classes
The basic definition of a (v, b, r, k)-design is too general to guarantee any
interesting connectivity or resilience properties of the resulting KPSs. We
first identify two potentially interesting classes of designs.
5.1.1 Prioritising local connectivity:
Our first class of designs are explicitly constructed for their local connectivity
properties. It was shown in [15] that any block in a (v, b, r, k)-design meets
(has a non-empty intersection) with at most k(r− 1) other blocks. Further,
every block meets k(r−1) blocks precisely when the design has the property
that any two blocks meet in at most one point, in which case the design
is known as a (v, b, r, k)-configuration. These (v, b, r, k)-configurations are
of interest since if they are used as key rings, the KPSs based on them
have optimal local connectivity [15]. Knowing that a design is a (v, b, r, k)-
configuration does not, unfortunately, offer any immediate guarantees about
its resilience.
5.1.2 Prioritising resilience:
A class of designs with built-in resilience properties are key distribution
patterns. These were first proposed in [23, 24], although we present a slightly
more general definition here.
Definition 5.1 A w-key distribution pattern (KDP) is a set system (I,B)
with |B| = n such that for any pair Bi, Bj ∈ B with Bi ∩ Bj 6= ∅ and any
{Bl1 , . . . , Blw} ⊆ B \ {Bi, Bj}, we have:
Bi ∩Bj 6⊆ (Bl1 ∪ · · · ∪Blw).
A w-KDP can be used as a key ring for a KPS and offers optimal resilience
if no more than w nodes are compromised. A w-KDP is only a design if
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it is also uniform and regular, which many known examples of KDPs are.
However, Definition 5.1 does not provide any guarantees of connectivity.
5.2 Fully Connected Designs
An obvious class of designs to consider are those that offer full connectivity,
which happens if every pair of blocks meet in at least one point.
5.2.1 Fully connected configurations:
It is shown in [15] that a (v, b, r, k) configuration is fully connected precisely
when it is the dual of a 2 − (b, v, k, r, 1)-design. It is further shown in [15]
that when this happens, b ≤ k(k − 1) + 1. Since b represents the number
of nodes in a WSN, and this is likely to be large, it is clear that this latter
bound is one that we would like to meet, if at all possible. Fortunately there
is an infinite class of configurations with this property, namely the projective
planes, which are 2− (q2 + q + 1, q2 + q + 1, q + 1, q + 1, 1)-designs.
This means that if we wish to directly implement a configuration as
a key ring in order to obtain a fully connected KPS with other desirable
properties then there is really only one candidate family worth considering,
the projective planes. Not only do they have optimal local connectivity, but
amongst other advantages they have efficient shared key discovery [25]. They
were first proposed as key rings by [7]. However the significant “catch” with
using a projective plane is the restriction on the number of nodes relative
to the size of the node allocation. This means that facilitating a very large
number of nodes comes at the unattractive cost of relatively large key storage
for each node (in this case each node allocation contains k identifers, where
k is approximately the square root of the maximum number nodes).
5.2.2 Fully connected KDPs:
The original concept of a KDP, as proposed in [23, 24], was for fully con-
nected KDPs. In this case a KDP, by definition, has every pair of blocks
meeting in at least one point. In [29] structures of this type are known
as (2, w)-KDPs. Several constructions of uniform and regular (2, w)-KDPs
are known. In [28, 24] it is shown that a 3-(v, k, λ) -design with w <
(v − 2)/(k − 2) is the dual of a (2, w)-KDP. In [24] it is shown that every
t− (v, b, r, k, λ)-design is a (2, t− 2)-KDP and every symmetric 2− (v, k, 2)-
design (biplane) is a (2, 1)-KDP. We also observe that the complete pairwise
KPS is a uniform, regular (2, n− 2)-KDP (as well as being a configuration).
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5.2.3 Dual designs:
By definition, the dual of a 2− (v, b, r, k, λ)-design is fully connected, since
every pair of blocks meet in λ points. A special subclass are the symmetric
designs, examples of which are the projective planes and the biplanes. In [27]
symmetric partially balanced designs were proposed as key rings, however
they share the problems of projective planes in being highly constrained in
terms of the number of nodes they can support.
5.2.4 Comment:
In general, fully connected designs are unsuitable for direct application as
KPSs for WSNs. Full connectivity places too many constraints on the pa-
rameters. The main resulting problems are:
• Lack of flexibility : While there are a number of constructions, they
leave little room for flexibility of tradeoff between the important pa-
rameters.
• Restrictions on number of nodes: The tradeoff between number of
nodes and storage tends to be unsatisfactory, with reasonable storage
limitations leading to too tight a restriction on the maximum number
of nodes.
• Too much to the extreme: Full connectivity provides better connectiv-
ity than we typically need for a WSN. The cost in terms of storage
and resiliency is too high to be worth paying for most WSNs.
Nonetheless, direct application of designs in this way provides more baseline
KPSs with special properties for comparison, as well as being potentially
useful components in more complex constructions.
5.3 Designs Without Full Connectivity
Given that full connectivity is not necessary for a KPS for a WSN, it is worth
considering direct application of designs that do not have full connectivity.
In such designs there will be blocks that do not intersect. This means that
there will be pairs of nodes who do not share a key in the resulting KPS.
In the first instance it seems wise to consider configurations, since these at
least offer optimal local connectivity.
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5.3.1 Generalised Quadrangles:
In [7] the use of generalised quadrangles as WSN key rings was considered.
A GQ(s, t) is a (v, b, t + 1, s + 1) -design, where v = (s + 1)(st + 1), b =
(t+1)(st+1), two points lie on at most one block, two blocks meet in at most
one point, and a further property that outlaws the occurrence of “triangles”
holds. A GQ(s, t) is thus a configuration and hence offers optimal local
connectivity. In [7] several GQ(s, t)s were shown to enable KPSs with good
resilience compared to the random KPS.
5.3.2 Common Intersection Designs:
The idea behind the use of GQ(s, t)’s as key rings was generalised in [15]:
Definition 5.2 Let (I,B) be a (v, b, r, k)-configuration. We say that (I,B)
is a (v, b, r, k, µ)-common intersection design (CID) if for any distinct pair of
blocks Bi, Bj ∈ B we have: |{Bk ∈ B : Bi ∩Bk 6= ∅ and Bj ∩Bk 6= ∅}| ≥ µ.
Thus any key ring based on a CID provides the guarantee that if two nodes
do not share a key, there will be at least µ nodes who could act as inter-
mediaries in a secure two-hop path between the original nodes. From a
connectivity perspective it is desirable for µ to be as large as possible since
this increases the chance that one of these intermediary nodes is within
communication range. Several upper bounds on µ were established in [17]
and optimal CIDs were constructed using group-divisible designs, strongly-
regular graphs and generalized quadrangles.
5.3.3 Transversal Designs:
A useful class of CIDs is provided by the transversal designs, since a TD(k, n)
is a (kn, n2, n, k, k2 − k)-CID. In [15] a particularly useful construction of
TD(k, n)s that exist for any prime k ≤ n was used to construct CIDs. The
resulting key rings, termed linear schemes in [14] have several interesting
properties:
• The values of k and n can be varied to produce key rings with a range
of compromises between the storage k, maximum number of nodes n2,
local connectivity k(n+ 1) and resilience.
• Local connectivity and resilience can be computed using formulae that
were derived in [14].
• They have a very efficient shared-key discovery phase, which involves
two nodes exchanging identifiers and making a simple computation.
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5.3.4 Generalised Transversal Designs:
An example of a class of designs that do not offer full connectivity and are
not configurations are the generalised transversal designs TD(t, k, n). For
example, a block in a TD(3, k, n) intersects other blocks in either 0, 1 or
2 points, hence is not a configuration. In [14] TD(3, k, n)s were used to
construct key rings based on a requirement that a pair of nodes shares two
keys before they can derive a session key. The performance of these so-called
quadratic schemes was analysed in [14] and shown to offer some interesting
tradeoffs. For example, they offered better resilience than linear schemes
for low levels of compromised nodes, while providing similar levels of local
connectivity.
5.3.5 Trivial KDPs:
Let G be a connected graph on n vertices with no loops or multiple edges.
Associate a vertex with node Uj, assign a unique key identifier xi to each
edge, and define node allocation Bj to be the the set of edges (key identifiers)
adjacent to Uj . The result is an (n − 2)-KDP, which offers the maximum
possible resilience. This is an example of a trivial inclusion-KDP [19]. The
advantage of designing KPSs in this way is that G can be analysed for con-
nectivity and path-length properties. Trivial KDPs are (v, b, 2, k) -designs
when G is regular of degree k.
In [16] it was pointed out that one class arise from strongly regular
graphs, since these graphs offer a guaranteed number of possible two-hop
paths between any disconnected nodes. The cost associated with a trivial
KDP is that in order to get good levels of connectivity the graph typically
needs to be “dense” with edges, which means that the storage for each user
tends to be on the high side. The IOS KPSs in [16] employ a trick for
reducing this storage which works if G is a connected regular graph whose
vertices have even degree. This comes at a small computational cost, as well
as the security cost of relying on a hash function.
5.3.6 Comment:
Designs without full connectivity are certainly more promising for design-
ing KPSs for WSNs. The main advantage over fully connected designs is
increased room for flexibility. The local connectivity levels can be traded off
against other parameters, particularly resilience. This increased relaxation
of parameters also tends to facilitate an increase in the maximum num-
ber of nodes that can be supported given a particular storage constraint.
15
Nonetheless, a number of problems remain:
• Lack of flexibility : While flexibility is generally better than for fully
connected designs, it is still severely constrained by the combinatorial
requirements.
• Restrictions on number of nodes: Despite an improvement, there is
still a limit to the number of nodes that can be supported, again due
to the combinatorial constraints.
Direct application of designs without full connectivity thus provides another
interesting collection of KPSs. It should be noted however that in compari-
son to fully connected designs, these designs have not been so much studied
and so useful constructions may have not yet been discovered. While their
direct applicability is limited, they again provide excellent components for
building more complex KPSs.
5.4 On Direct Application of Designs
The rich mathematical structure of combinatorial designs makes them suit-
able for building KPSs with particular properties. However most interesting
classes of design probably offer too much structure. Some designs offer “all
or nothing” guarantees of properties, when a more gradual curve would be
preferable. An example of this is w-KDPs (for small w), whose resilience
guarantees are no longer offered when more than w nodes are compromised.
Designs are also uniform and regular by definition, although there is no
strict need for these properties in a KPS. The main problem however is that
straight application of designs tends not to provide enough flexibility to gen-
erate a wide range of KPSs suitable for different application requirements.
6 Designs as a Building Block
Although combinatorial designs are not always suitable for direct application
as KPSs for WSNs, they are very natural objects to use as components in
the construction of a KPS. The resulting KPSs can hopefully be made more
flexible, while still inheriting the advantages of designs that were outlined
at the start of Sect. 5. Another way of looking at this is to start with a
KPS based on direct application of a design and consider in what ways we
could transform the original scheme in order to “get more for our money”.
We now consider a number of different techniques.
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6.1 Splitting a KPS
One way of modifying a KPS is to split nodes, by associating each node
in the original KPS with a set of nodes in a new KPS. The new scheme
essentially consists of l versions of the original KPS. The main gain here is
that this allows an l-fold increase in the number of possible nodes in the
network compared to the original scheme.
The simplest technique is to essentially create l “mirror copies” of the
original KPS, where each split node is assigned the same node allocation
of keys as its parent node. For general applications, this might seem a
strange thing to do since there will now be l nodes with exactly the same
keys. However, for many applications of WSNs, particularly those where the
main required security service is confidentiality with respect to non-members
of the network, this may well be quite acceptable.
The other extreme is to associate each version of the original KPS with
a disjoint set of key identifiers. This will result in a significant reduction in
the connectivity, since only nodes associated with a particular version will
share keys. Partially overlapping sets of key identifiers will allow tradeoff
between these two extremes.
The Multiple IOS KPSs in [16] used this idea of splitting to increase the
maximum network size of the IOS KPS (see Sect. 5.3). Since they are slightly
different from our standard notion of a key rings (as defined in Sect. 4.1),
the cost of splitting is different (in this case it is a loss of resilience).
6.2 Extending a KPS
As noted in Sect. 5, one of the main problems with straight application of a
combinatorial design as a KPS is the restriction on the maximum number
of nodes. One technique for overcoming this is to generate a KPS based
on a combinatorial design and then extend it by appending additional node
allocations that are not part of the original scheme.
This technique was used in [7] to extend KPSs based on projective planes
and generalized quadrangles. In order to enforce a degree of separation be-
tween the appended node allocations and the originals, the new node alloca-
tions were selected as random subsets of blocks of the complementary design
(whose blocks are the complements of the blocks of the original design). The
resulting KPSs were analysed in [7] and shown to have better connectivity
than a random KPS, while allowing a greater number of nodes and increased
resilience in comparison to the underlying design-based KPSs.
Another possibility is to combine the node allocations of two different
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KPSs. This approach was taken in [27], where two KPSs arising from direct
application of two partially balanced designs were combined. The resulting
KPS remained fully connected, while the resiliency of the new scheme was
slightly poorer than those of the original KPSs.
6.3 Packing a KPS
Another option is to increase the size of node allocations by adding key
identifiers (packing). By packing the key identifiers more densely, we can
expect better connectivity properties at an expected cost to resilience.
We saw in Sect. 5.3 that some combinatorial designs without full connec-
tivity have attractive properties for adoption as key rings. However, such
designs often have low inherent connectivity. In [9] two packing strategies
were tested in an attempt to increase the connectivity of the linear KPSs
based on transversal designs. Both strategies involved merging KPS node
allocations. The first strategy was random, whereas the second was deter-
ministic. The results indeed indicate a small increase in connectivity at a
small cost to resilience.
6.4 Breaking up a KPS
An alternative to making a KPS “bigger” through extending or packing is to
break it up in various ways. Two initial suggestions for creating potentially
interesting tradeoffs are:
• Contracting a KPS : By removing key identifiers, either throughout
the KPS or just on certain nodes, storage could be reduced at a cost
to connectivity.
• Block splitting : By splitting node allocations (for example creating two
smaller node allocations from each original node allocation by dividing
it in two) the maximum network size could be increased and storage
reduced, again at a cost to connectivity.
To our knowledge, the full benefits of these strategies as techniques for
building KPSs with interesting properties have not yet been fully explored.
6.5 Modifying a KPS
Designs can be used to make structural modifications to an existing KPS.
An interesting example of this is the Modified Blom KPS [16]. The Blom
KPS, defined in Sect. 4.3, is a fully connected KPS based on a symmetric
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polynomial of degree w. In the Modified Blom KPS, we first define a com-
plete bipartite graph on the set of nodes, which splits the nodes into two
classes U1 and U2. We now establish a “Blom KPS” using an asymmetric
polynomial (see [16] for details), which results in only pairs of nodes from
distinct classes directly being able to establish a key. Nodes from the same
class are required to establish a two-hop path via a node in the other class.
This loss of connectivity comes at a gain in resilience, since an attacker now
needs to compromise w nodes from one of the classes before the KPS is
completely broken.
6.6 Joining KPSs
A more sophisticated use of KPSs as building blocks is to join many copies
of a KPS together. Of course, we need a “rule” to determine how the
integration is done. A natural source of such a rule is another KPS, perhaps
with quite different properties. The intention is that the resulting KPS will
mix the inherent properties of the component schemes.
6.6.1 Product KPS:
In such schemes an inner KPS and an outer set system (I,Bout) are inte-
grated in the following way:
1. The outer set system provides the core structure. Each node Uj is
associated with the block Boutj .
2. Each key identifier xi in the set system defines a subset of nodes Ni =
{Uj : xi ∈ B
out
j }. An inner KPS is then defined on the nodes Ni. In
this KPS, each node Uj ∈ Ni receives the node allocation B
in−i
j .
3. Only the node allocations of the inner KPSs are used in the final KPS.
Hence each node Uj receives the final node allocation
Bj = ∪xi∈Boutj B
in−i
j .
Hence each node in the product KPS receives a final node allocation that
consists of several inner KPS node allocations, one for each key identifier in
the block associated with the node in the outer set system.
Note that while we have defined the Product KPS in terms of inner
KPSs based on a key ring, there is no reason why other KPSs cannot be
used. Indeed the low storage of the Blom KPS, which derives its key ring
rather than storing it explicitly is an attractive candidate for the inner KPS,
as will see in some of the following instantiations of this generic scheme.
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6.6.2 Wei-Wu Product schemes:
In [30] a general analysis of the Product KPS was conducted. It was shown
that if the block size is fixed then the best resilience can be obtained if the
outer set system is a design. Several constructions were proposed that used
Blom KPSs as the inner KPS and used designs based on difference sets as
the outer set system.
6.6.3 Multiple Space Blom scheme:
In [14] a product KPS was proposed where the outer set system is a linear
KPS (see Sect. 5.3) and the inner KPSs are Blom KPSs. The resulting
KPS was shown to have a different resilience curve compared to a linear
scheme (better resilience for small numbers of compromised nodes) at the
cost of some computation in order to establish keys. The efficient shared-key
discovery property of both components is preserved.
6.6.4 Multiple Space Modified Blom scheme:
In [16] a product KPS was proposed where the outer set system consists of
a trivial KDP based on a strongly regular graph that has been split into
l identical copies (as in Sect. 6.1) and the inner KPSs are Modified Blom
KPSs. The Modified Blom KPSs were applied using the natural partition
defined by the two classes of split nodes adjacent to each edge in the strongly
regular graph. The resulting scheme was shown to have a different resilience
curve compared to deploying a Modified Blom KPS across all nodes.
6.6.5 Park-Blake schemes:
In [25] complete subgraphs of two strongly regular graphs (the triangular
graph and lattice graph) were used to define outer set systems. It was shown
that if projective planes are used as the inner KPSs then the new schemes
allow a greatly increased network size while still gaining from the efficient
shared key discovery of the projective plane. Clearly these constructions
also lend themselves to use of Blom schemes as the inner KPSs.
6.6.6 Scope for Joining KPSs:
Joining KPSs seems to be an interesting way of generating KPSs with dif-
ferent parameter tradeoffs. There seems to be plenty of scope for further
exploring effective ways of combining KPSs, as most of the existing work has
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focussed on instantiations of the Product KPS and employed Blom’s KPS
as the inner KPSs.
6.7 The Pros and Cons of Combinatorial Engineering
In Sect. 5 we saw that direct application of combinatorial designs is generally
too restrictive to produce KPSs that are suitable for WSNs. In this section
we have discussed a number of different techniques for using KPSs based
on designs as building blocks. There is no reason why these techniques
could not be used to combine deterministic KPSs based on designs with
probabilistic random KPSs.
With the exception of layered KPSs, this “combinatorial engineering” is
not a normal study area for pure mathematicians and hence little theory
on the subject exists. Indeed, for many of the techniques, the underlying
combinatorial structure is sufficiently destroyed that the resulting properties
can only be determined by simulations.
It might be felt that combinatorial engineering is self-defeating in that
many of the advantages of using combinatorial designs may be lost, espe-
cially if they are combined with probabilistic KPSs. However it would seem
that some combinatorics can be better than no combinatorics, since the
properties of the underlying design-based KPS in most cases still provides
some structural guarantees. It is also important to keep in mind the obser-
vations made in Sect. 4.3 and 5.4, which indicate that KPSs for WSNs are
not by definition classical combinatorial objects and thus lend themselves to
this type of manipulation.
7 Designs for Special Networking Environments
In this section we examine the application of combinatorial designs to KPSs
that do not fully conform to the application environment of uncontrolled
homogeneous nodes that we have discussed thus far.
7.1 Partially Controlled KPSs
The KPSs that we have discussed thus far are all uncontrolled (see Sect. 2)
with respect to their final location. If we are able to have partial control
over the location of nodes then this knowledge can be very useful in building
a suitable KPS.
An example of partial control occurs in networks in which nodes are
deployed in groups in such a way that nodes from a group are deployed
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closer together on average than nodes from different groups. This group
deployment might arise, for example, if nodes are deployed in batches from
an aeroplane. It would be reasonable to expect nodes from one group to then
be physically located closer to one another than nodes from different groups.
As a result, keys can be predistributed more efficiently if this knowledge is
taken into account.
A possible paradigm is to assign node allocations to each group using
a KPS defined only on that group. This KPS could be more “relaxed”
with respect to connectivity than an uncontrolled KPS. We then need to
build in some means for nodes from different groups to establish common
keys. However it is also important to avoid communication bottlenecks, or
the risk that an entire group could become disconnected from the rest of
the network, so it is desirable to ensure that the probability of nodes from
different groups being able to communicate securely is similar to that of
nodes from within a group. This property was referred to as balanced local
connectivity in [21].
The inherent structure required for group deployment of a KPS that has
balanced local connectivity lends itself naturally to use of a combinatorial
structure. In [21] such a KPS was proposed that utilises the structure of a re-
solvable transversal design TD(k,m). The m parallel classes P1, P2, . . . , Pm
of blocks of this design are further partitioned into µ sets of parallel classes
S1, S2, . . . , Sµ, each containing m/µ blocks. Nodes in group Gi are associ-
ated with the blocks in parallel classes contained in Si. The proposed KPS
is based on the Multiple Space Blom scheme of Sect. 6.6, with the outer
KPS being a based on the resolvable TD(k,m). However in this KPS there
are two inner KPSs:
1. As in the Multiple Space Blom scheme, for each key identifier xi in
the outer KPS, a Blom KPS is defined on the nodes Ni = {Uj : xi ∈
Boutj }.
2. A further Blom KPS is defined on the set of nodes Mi = {Uj : B
out
j ∈
Pi}.
The analysis of the resulting KPS in [21] shows that it offers good balanced
connectivity, while providing a flexible set of configurable parameters that
allow connectivity and resilience to be traded off against storage costs. The
KPS also inherits the efficient shared key discovery of the underlying outer
KPS based on the transversal design.
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7.2 Fully Controlled KPSs
It is of significant advantage for key predistribution to know the precise
deployment location of nodes, since this is even more useful than partial
location information, as discussed above. It might seem that in such cases
of fully controlled networks it suffices to issue a node with keys for each of its
neighbours, since these are known in advance. However in dense networks
this is an inefficient technique and there are much better options.
If nodes are deployed in a highly structured physical formation then it
again becomes natural to look to combinatorial mathematics for building
KPSs. The case of KPSs for WSNs arranged in square and hexagonal grids
has been investigated in [4] and [3]. Efficient KPSs were constructed using
a special type of combinatorial structure called a distinct difference config-
uration. While these are not combinatorial designs, the node assignments
that they generate can be viewed as a type of infinite combinatorial design.
Nonetheless, this example serves a warning that there are special networking
environments where the “right” combinatorial structure for building efficient
deterministic KPSs is not necessarily based on a conventional combinatorial
design.
7.3 KPSs for Heterogeneous Networks
Although we restricted our previous discussion to homogeneous networks
(see Sect. 2) it is worth making some observations about heterogeneous net-
works, where not all the nodes have the same capabilities. The most in-
teresting class of heterogeneous network is probably hierarchical networks,
where the nodes are partitioned into an ordered hierarchy, with nodes at
a given level being more powerful than nodes at lower levels. The most
common scenario is a simple two-level hierarchy. We now make a few obser-
vations about the applicability of combinatorial designs to building KPSs
for heterogeneous networks, and in particular two-level hierarchies.
7.3.1 Simple two-level hierarchies:
It is worth observing that many of the manipulations of KPSs discussed in
Sect. 6 can result in KPSs that are suitable for simple two-level hierarchies,
since the resulting node allocations have different sizes. For example:
• A KPS could be partially packed (see Sect. 6.3) using a strategy that
results in node allocations of two different sizes, the original and the
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packed. Nodes with packed node allocations will require greater stor-
age capability. Further, as they hold more keys it is reasonable to
expect them to be more likely to be involved in communication (both
directly and as an intermediary). The resulting KPS is suited to ap-
plications where there is a two-level hierarchy of sensors where there
is a fairly small difference in capability.
• Similarly, if a KPS is extended (see Sect. 6.2) by adding node alloca-
tions of a different size to the original, then the resulting KPS will have
similar properties to the previous case. For example, the extension to
the projective plane discussed in [7] could involve choosing larger sub-
sets of the complementary design, hence creating two classes of node
allocations.
7.3.2 Two-level hierarchies with a backbone:
A more sophisticated class of two-level hierarchies are formed by networks
where the top level of nodes form a fully connected backbone. Low level nodes
are organised into subnetworks (sometime called clusters) which “hang off”
this backbone and are each associated with a unique high level node. Two
low level nodes from the same subnetwork can try to communicate directly.
On the other hand, two low level nodes from different subnetworks have to
communicate via their high level node representatives. The top level nodes
thus need to be significantly more powerful than low level nodes, since they
are used as communication intermediaries. It is thus also reasonable to
assume that they have significantly increased storage capability.
There are many different possible approaches to designing a two-level
hierarchical KPS with a backbone. The fully connected backbone could
be realised, for example, by any of the KPSs discussed in Sect. 7.2. The
subnetworks could be instantiated by any KPS (based on a design, or oth-
erwise). There has been a significant amount of general research on key
management in two-level hierarchical networks but, with the exception of
a simple framework proposed in [10], there has been very little analysis of
how to build deterministic two-level KPSs. There seems to be plenty of
scope for further examining exactly how best to choose both the backbone
and subnetwork KPSs in order to achieve two-level hierarchical KPSs with
interesting properties. In particular, intelligent application of design-based
KPSs would seem quite likely to lead to useful constructions.
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7.4 Comment
We have seen in this section that combinatorial designs have had a role
to play in building KPSs for WSNs that do not conform to the “classical”
model of uncontrolled homogeneous nodes. They have found very natural
application to group deployment of nodes, but are apparently less applicable
to fully controlled deployment of nodes. What remains largely unexplored
is their suitability to the design of deterministic heterogenous WSNs, and
this merits further study.
8 Concluding Remarks
We have explored the use of combinatorial designs in building KPS for
WSNs. While designs have been widely proposed for use in such schemes, to
what extent are these schemes really useful? We argued that for WSNs full
connectivity is not really necessary and that a key attribute of any KPS is
flexibility to allow parameter tradeoffs. This tends to rule out many straight
applications of designs as KPSs, although we have seen several examples of
flexible families of designs, such as transversal designs, having several useful
applications. However it certainly does not rule out designs either as build-
ing blocks or components of KPSs. The unusual combinatorial engineering
techniques that have seen the basic structure of a design manipulated in
order to provide more flexible KPSs are certainly interesting and merit fur-
ther study, although formal theoretical analysis of such techniques (as in
many engineering processes) is not always possible. Combining KPSs based
on designs has proved to be a very successful strategy for obtaining deter-
ministic KPSs that trade off parameters, however again there would seem
to be more work to do in fully understanding the best combination rules.
Thus we would argue that combinatorial designs most definitely do have
an important role to play in building KPSs for WSNs, but that their full
potential is not yet fully understood.
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